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BOOK REVIEW

The Theory of Law as Literature
DENNIS PATTERSONt
Literary Criticisms of Law. By Guyora Binder & Robert
Weisberg. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Pp. 544. $75.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
Of the various "movements" in law, few have seen the
growth and diversity found in law and literature. While the
causes and explanations of this are surely diverse, a
material part of the explanation has to be the fact that law
can be looked at both as a literary artifact and as a subject
of literary study. That is, it is possible both to study the
ways in which law is represented in literature (e.g., Charles
Dickens' Bleak House) and to evaluate the law as literature.
In their comprehensive and important work, Guyora
Binder and Robert Weisberg take up this second aspect, the
study of law as literature. Binder and Weisberg summarize,
evaluate, and critique five principal literary theories of law.
Their work is comprehensive, sophisticated, and learned.
Anyone with an interest in law and literature, literary
criticism, or legal theory will find much of interest in this
book. For the foreseeable future, Literary Criticisms of Law
will be the critical/encyclopedic work in the field.'
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University, School of Law
(Camden). J.D., Ph.D. (Philosophy), 1980, State University of New York at
Buffalo. Thanks to my colleague, Kimberly Ferzan, for helpful comments on a
draft of this Review.
1. An excellent overview of law and literature can be found in Thomas
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A great strength of the book is the sheer volume and
diversity of works discussed. Binder and Weisberg
consistently and successfully blur the lines between literary
theory and philosophy. They range across the work of
authors as diverse as Ronald Dworkin and Jacques Derrida,
Paul de Man and Aristotle, as well as every major school
(and many minor schools) of criticism and literary theory.
In the space of this review, I can mention only some of
these, and focus attention on just a few. The necessity of
focus should not indicate anything less than complete
admiration for the depth, breadth, and sophistication of the
analysis advanced by Binder and Weisberg. This is a very
interesting book.
Following an introduction which sets out or identifies
some of the problems of law and literature, Chapter One
considers "Interpretative Crises in American Legal
Thought."2 In Chapter One the author's argue that the case
for treating law as a literary artifact rests upon the premise
"that interpretation is the central activity of legal
actors ....

."'

While neither endorsing nor contesting this

assumption in a straightforward way, Binder and Weisberg
show how interpretation has functioned in the history of
American law as an organizing theme. Starting from the
law of medieval Europe, and working their way through the
Renaissance to the reception of English common law in the
colonies, Binder and Weisberg trace the idea that
interpretation is an ineradicable feature of legal judgment,
one having both political and philosophical implications.
In their discussion of the common law, Binder and
Weisberg cover the arguments of familiar figures such as
Sir William Blackstone and Sir Edward Coke, and they are

particularly good in discussing the important but neglected
work of Francis Lieber, Legal and PoliticalHermeneutics'.
Lieber's life is traced from his birth in turn-of-the-century
Prussia to his studies at Jena, Halle, and Berlin (Lieber
was lucky enough to have Freidrich Schleiermacher, Georg
Morawetz's Law and Literature.See Thomas Morawetz, Law and Literature, in
7 BLACEWELL COMPANIONS TO PHILOSOPHY: A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 450-61 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
2. GUYoRA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 28

(2000).
3. Id.
4. FRANCIs LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (3d ed., St. Louis,
F.H. Thomas & Co. 1880) (1839).
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Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel, and Freidrich Karl von Savigny
as teachers). Interestingly, Lieber migrated to the United
States where he became a professor of law and politics at
the University of South Carolina and, later, Columbia
University. Binder and Weisberg describe Lieber as an
"institutionalist" in that he believed democracy flourished
in institutions, and not in the shadow of natural law.5 His
interpretative theory was "expressivist" in the hermeneutic
sense of the word, dealing as it does with author
subjectivity and context.' Of course, these ideas would later
become influential in the hermeneutic tradition as
developed by Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer.8
Chapter One also contains a long analysis of Abraham
Lincoln's use of rhetorical and hermeneutic devices. In fact,
Binder and Weisberg refer to "Lincoln's hermeneutic
constitution."9 Obviously, the Civil War and Reconstruction
are fertile topics for literary and theoretical analysis, and
Binder and Weisberg cover the Civil War, and
Reconstruction and its aftermath in some detail.
Binder and Weisberg then turn to interpretation as
theory. It is a truism that interpretive theories of law are
connected to or dependent upon larger political or
philosophical theories.'0 For example, the idea that law is
the expression of the will of a sovereign presents something
of a stark contrast with the common law process, which is
regarded as the product of custom and reason. Both of these
ideas have their histories, especially in the repeated
struggles over the scope of judicial discretion. Binder and
Weisberg cover much historical and conceptual ground,
discussing figures as diverse as Edward Corwin, Learned
Hand, Benjamin Cardozo,
and Lon Fuller. The
interpretative issues are largely discussed in the

5. See BINDER & WEISBERG, supranote 2, at 47-51.
6. See id.
7. For Heidegger's development of the hermeneutic tradition, see MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans.,
1962).
8. For Gadamer's development of the hermeneutic tradition, see HANSGEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall

rev. trans., 2d rev. ed., Crossroad 1989).
9. BINDER & WEISBERG, supranote 2, at 55.
10. This is the central premise of Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence. See
generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAw'S EMPIRE (1986) (advancing the thesis that law
is an "interpretive" practice).
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constitutional context, with Brown v. Board of Education11
the central focus. The views of the usual figures in this
discussion are carefully delineated. The discussion devolves
to a set of questions which set the tone for the remainder of
the book. Can law function as a means to realize desire? Can
the positivist dimension of law be reconciled with the
romantic nature of literature? What is the role of
subjectivity in the connection between language and the
world? Finally, the authors come to an interesting
conclusion: "legal hermeneutics" ran into trouble not
because meaning was found to be inherently unstable, but
because the American political process-specifically the
dispute over slavery--"proved too divisive for Legal
,,12
Hermeneutics to overcome ....
For the balance of Literary Criticisms of Law,
intellectual history gives way to theory, both
jurisprudential and literary. As mentioned, five approaches,
or schools of thought, are each discussed in detail. They are:
(1) hermeneutic criticism; (2) narrative criticism; (3)
rhetorical criticism; (4) deconstructive criticism; and (5)
cultural criticism. However, it is important to emphasize
that, happily, Binder and Weisberg maintain no rigid
distinction between literary theory and other forms of legal
theory. Their book ranges from discussions of French theory
(e.g., Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault) to analytic
philosophy of language (e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein and
Willard van Orman Quine). Of course, this is in keeping
with the current tenor of many discussions in the journals,
focusing as they do on all manner of "theory."
Chapter Two, devoted to hermeneutic criticism of law,
begins by introducing Ronald Dworkin as a "prominent
exponent of 'principle.' "13 The context for the discussion of
Dworkin is the topic of judicial discretion, although
Alexander Bickel and Fuller are mentioned, as well as a
classic focus, the work of H.L.A. Hart. 4 Chapter Two
provides an excellent summary of conventional literary
theories of interpretation, including Russian formalism and
New Criticism. New Criticism is a literary theory that takes
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
12. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 110.
13. Id. at 112.
14. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141-47 (Penelope A.
Bulloch & Joseph Raz postscript eds., 2d ed. 1994) (arguing that law is a system
of rules).
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the literary text as "autonomous" with a meaning that can
be gleaned by the reader. Understanding New Criticism is
important because it figures in Stanley Fish's efforts to
develop reader-response criticism, which stands New
Criticism on its head. 15
The discussion of hermeneutics in The Theory of Law as
Literature is both sophisticated and complete. Starting with
the theologian Schleiermacher, and working through
Heidegger and Gadamer (as well as less well-known figures
such as Roman Ingarden), familiar hermeneutic themes are
identified and discussed. There is a particularly astute
discussion of Richard Rorty's pragmatism and its
connection to hermeneutic thought. Just as Gadamer
believes that meaning can be understood without
metaphysical foundations, so too does Rorty claim that we
should dispense with the project of epistemology and
engage in "conversation. " "
The exemplary treatment of hermeneutics is followed
by a discussion of narrative and its role in the law. Chapter
Three begins by considering the claims of proponents of
narrative. ' The familiar critical theme of "giving voice" to
so-called "outgroups... whose consciousness.., has been
suppressed, devalued, [and] abnormalized," presumes an
antimony between law and narrative.?8 Binder and
Weisberg are skeptical of this opposition. In fact, they
describe the turn to narrative as offering "not so much
interdisciplinarity as extradisciplinarity, an escape from
one's own discipline into a literary playground, unpoliced by
literary professionals." 9 Chapter Three, as the authors
describe it, is "a critique not primarily of narrative legal
scholarship but of some of the extravagant and
sentimentalist claims made on its behalf.""
Of particular interest here is the analysis of Patricia

15. Fish famously argues that the reader creates the meaning of the text in
the course of her interpretation or reading of the text (the two operations are
the same for Fish). I discuss the merits of Fish's work in my book, Law and
Truth. DENNIS M. PATTERSON, LAw AND TRUTH 99-127 (1996).
16. See generally RIcHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE
(1979) (arguing that epistemology is an unproductive philosophical enterprise).
17. BINDER & WEISBERG, supranote 2, at 201.
18. Id. (quoting Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others:
A Plea for Narrative,87 MICH. L. REv. 2411-12 (1989)).
19. Id. at 207.
20. Id. at 209.
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Williams's much-discussed "diary of a law professor" in The
Alchemy of Race and Rights.2 Accurately describing
Williams' book as both a "presentation of self' and a
"meditation on the presentation of self in a public space
framed by commerce, mass media, and racial hierarchy,""
Binder and Weisberg describe the self presented by
Williams as " 'fashionably' fragmented."2" The analysis of
Williams's book is subtle and detailed (particular attention
is paid to the infamous "Benneton" story).
Binder and Weisberg are strikingly even-handed in
their discussion of Williams's work. For example, they
discuss a review of The Alchemy of Race and Rights by
Anne Coughlin.24 Coughlin argues that "there is nothing
particularly avant-garde or rebellious about [Williams's]
apologetic project." Coughlin criticizes Williams for failing
to enhance her prose with multiple meanings. As Binder
and Weisberg summarize the critique:
Williams tends to present her ideas framed within narratives in
which she jets to one or another prestigious venue where she
lectures skeptical, sullen listeners who are portrayed as "flat,
unreflective, ill-educated and bigoted." Their objections are always
"impatient, insensitive and dull." Rather than savoring multiple
meanings, readers must "endorse Williams's meaning" on pain of
being associated with these yahoos.

"Rhetorical Criticism of Law," the subject of Chapter
Four, takes up a venerable topic. 27 Binder and Weisberg
survey the classical origins of rhetoric, with special
attention to Plato. By far the most interesting discussion in
this chapter concerns the work of Bickel. In the
introductory chapter, Binder and Weisberg identify Bickel
as influential in developing a hermeneutic/interpretative
framework to deal with the constitutional crisis posed by
race relations in America. As they describe it, per Bickel,
"the political and social crisis of race relations precipitated
by the Civil Rights movement was above all a problem of
21. PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF

RACE AND RIGHTS

(1991).

22. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 257.

23. Id.
24. Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating The Self-AutobiographicPerformancesIn
OutsiderScholarship,81 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1302 (1995).
25. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 260.
26. Id. (quoting Coughlin, supranote 24, at 1311-12).
27. Id. at 292.
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judicial discretion to interpret the Constitution."28 Bickel's
jurisprudence is "thoroughly classical in aesthetic
sensibility and rhetorical in method."29 In combining
prudential reasoning with rhetorical eloquence, Bickel
emerges as the single most important figure in responding
to constitutional crisis in a sophisticated rhetorical fashion.
As is the case with other chapters in this work, there
are many topics that can only be mentioned briefly. These
include discussions of the work of Richard Weaver, Leo
Strauss, James Boyd White, and the recent work of Richard
Sherwin." While the authors discuss a division in approach
to rhetoric along political lines (the labels are "conservative"
and "liberal"), that is not the most interesting aspect of
Chapter Four. Rhetoric in all its forms and manifestations
is canvassed and, most importantly, connections are drawn
between rhetorical theories and legal doctrine (especially in
the area of constitutional law). Again, this continuing effort
on the part of Binder and Weisberg to tie together theory
and doctrine is to good effect.
Of course, Binder and Weisberg also discuss
deconstruction.
What
more
could
be
said
of
deconstruction?3 While deconstruction has enjoyed its
greatest success in departments of comparative literature,
its advocates found more than a few welcome mats placed
at the doors of American law schools. It may be helpful to
take a moment and ask why this came to pass.
More than virtually any other academic legal tradition,
American academic culture has always been fond of
skepticism. The usual suspects-American Legal Realism
and Critical Legal Studies-focused almost exclusively on
epistemological skepticism-the idea that we can never
know what is "really" doing the normative work when it
comes to adjudication. In a sense, American legal academics
were ready and waiting for deconstruction, for it supplied
28. Id. at 310.
29. Id.
30. See generally RICHARD K. SHERWIN,

WHEN LAW GOES PoP: THE

VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTuRE (2000) (critiquing law as

popular culture).
31. Apparently New York University thinks deconstruction merits further
study, as the University has designated October 2000 as "Derrida Month." See
New York University, OCTOBER is DERRIDA MONTH at NYU, at
http://vvw.nyu.edu/projects/derrida/des.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2001) (on file
with the Buffalo Law Review).
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much-desired fuel for the hermeneutics of suspicion.
What does deconstruction add to the appetite for
skepticism? Before answering this question, I have to credit
Binder and Weisberg for calling deconstruction the way
they see it. They notice ten themes in deconstruction. 2 Of
these, five are characterized as "less original" than the
remaining five."3 The first five are characterized as
"adaptions of the anti-essentialist themes of pragmatist
epistemology to the practice of reading."' This is indeed the
case.
35
As early as his first book, Speech and Phenomena,
Derrida was arguing against all forms of philosophical
essentialism, especially Platonic essentialism. Derrida's
arguments moved in the direction of analytically-oriented
philosophers such as Wittgenstein,36 so much so that some
Wittgensteinians actually wrote of fruitful comparisons
between Wittgenstein and Derrida" While Wittgenstein
argued that skepticism was philosophically unsound,
Derrida maintained that skepticism's psychological faceuncertainty-is a permanent feature of the epistemological
stance.
Binder and Weisberg eschew focus on the philosophical
aspects of deconstruction in favor of the ethical/political
dimension. Here they add something to the general
literature on deconstruction-an assessment of the political
dimensions of identity." It has often been said that
deconstruction has no particular political commitments.
This, it seems, is a criticism. Binder and Weisberg are
32. These ten themes are: (1) the Principle of Differentiation; (2) the
Principle of Iterability; (3) the Principle of Rhetoricity; (4) the Concept of the
"Trace"; (5) the Principle of Unbounded Textuality; (6) the Critique of Closure;
(7) the Critique of "Presence"; (8) the Critique of Dualism; (9) the Critique of
Narrative; and (10) the Critique of Figuration. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note
2, at 381-83.
33. Id. at 383.
34. Id.
35. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
HUSSERL'S THEORY OF SIGNS (David B. Allison trans., 1973).
36. See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed., Macmillan 1968) (arguing that linguistic
meaning is best understood as a social phenomenon).
37. See Newton Garver, Preface to DERRIDA, supranote 35, at ix-xxix.
38. For an excellent general discussion of the (lack of) political dimensions of
Derrida's work, see Mark Lilla, The Politics of Jacques Derrida, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, June 25, 1998, at 36-41.
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undeterred by this criticism. In fact, they find much in
Derrida's thought that is political. Their particular interest
is identity, specifically personal identity. The focus of their
critique is Derrida's defense of the anti-Semitic newspaper
articles by Paul de Man." How can Derrida defend de Man
while he maintains that identities are reductionist, that
there is nothing but endless textuality, and critique
impossible? Binder and Weisberg's critique of Derrida on de
Man is an instructive lesson on the limits of deconstruction.
Binder and Weisberg make a detailed case for the
proposition that even in the hands of the master himself,
deconstruction is beset with the very contradictions and
limitations it seeks to identify in discourse generally. As
they put it, "Derrida's cavalier assimilation of the quite
disparate phenomena of racism, anti-Semitism and
totalitarianism exemplifies the 'logic of identity' he
criticizes as 'totalizing.' ,A
Derrida and deconstruction have, of course, made their
way into contemporary academic legal circles. Yeshiva
University's Cardozo Law School hosted a conference on
"Deconstruction and The Possibility of Justice" for which
Derrida was the main attraction. In his contribution to the
symposium, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of
Authority,'"1 Derrida put together two lectures, only one of
which was given at the Cardozo conference. The other,
delivered off-site, was for the benefit of a group of Holocaust
historians. The focus of the second lecture was the work of
Walter Benjamin. Taken together, the two lectures are at
best inconsistent and contradictory. What accounts for this?
Binder and Weisberg explain:
[RIegardless of the persuasiveness of Derrida's critique of
Benjamin in the second lecture, it dramatically alters the meaning
of the first lecture. While the first lecture denies that justice can
be institutionalized in a state, the second lecture argues that
efforts to institutionalize the messianic yearning for justice in a
subversive social movement lead to atrocity. Any political effort to
39. See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 394-98. The entire de Man
story is intelligently discussed in DAvED LEIHiAN, SIGNS OF THE Tm s (1991).
For a sympathetic appraisal of deconstruction from the perspective of
philosophy, see SAMUEL C. WHEELER III, DECONSTRUCTION AS ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY (2000).
40. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 398 (footnote omitted).
41. Jaques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority,"
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (1990).
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institutionalize justice is totalitarian, Derrida implies. Thus, the
affiliation between deconstruction and radical politics suggested in
the first lecture is firmly repudiated in the second. And if he
affiliates deconstructive criticism with justice, that is because he
views the idea of justice as too dangerous to play a role in any
affirmative political program. Far from identifying deconstruction
with radical politics, he advocates deconstruction as a safely
ineffectual outlet for 4the
messianic yearning for justice that
2
inspires radical politics.

The balance of Chapter Five is given over to summaries
and critiques of the work of various deconstructive foot
soldiers in the legal academy. These include Jack Balkin,
Pierre Schlag, Gerald Frug, and Gary Peller. A great deal of
ground is covered. Chapter Five concludes with discussion
of the topic "Deconstruction as Ethical Criticism. ' Here
the work of Derrida's most ardent legal interpreter,
Drucilla Cornell, is discussed. While praising some aspects
of Cornell's work, the authors find serious fault with
Cornell's explication of deconstruction. They explain:
Cornell's efforts to portray deconstruction as an ethic of respect for
dissident viewpoints seems strained. Like Desan, Cornell ascribes
to Derrida a relativist epistemology in which truth inheres in a
diversity of discrete viewpoints. Yet Derrida's principles of
iterability, trace, and textuality imply that there are no discrete
viewpoints, since every position contains traces of its alternatives
and opposites. Despite Derrida's argument in his second "Force of
Law" lecture that apocalyptic appeals to the ideal of justice are
dangerously totalitarian, Cornell characterizes deconstruction as
"utopian." She apparently accepts the first lecture, which purports
to identify deconstruction with justice, and which was delivered to
her own faculty, entirely at face value. She barely notices the
second lecture that deconstructs the first, and insofar as she
mentions it, she reads it only as a repetition of the first lecture's
utopian injunction that law not be identified with justice-missing
the more fundamental critique of justice itself as a violent and
totalitarian aspiration.

Chapter Six, entitled "Cultural Criticism of Law"
addresses topics closest to the personal scholarly interests
of Binder and Weisberg. 5 The easiest way to characterize
42.
43.
44.
45.

BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 407.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 450 (internal footnotes omitted).
Id. at 462.
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their position is to say that they want to look at law as a
cultural product. Their interest lies in how we use law to
fashion images of ourselves. In short, law is interrogated or
investigated as part of the meaning-making process
identified as "culture." By comparison to the scholarly
movements that have had an impact on law (I have in mind
economics, political theory, and philosophy), cultural
criticism, or the critical evaluation of culture, has seen far
less attention. At first, this might seem odd, as cultural
criticism seems to be a natural complement to law. Part of
the explanation is that cultural criticism lacks a ready
method and a small set of questions as opposed to, for
example, the economic analysis of law, which has a central
focus of efficiency. Of course, efficiency has its critics, and
efficiency comes in more than one variety. But the point is
that the discourse of economics is focused in a way that
cultural criticism is not.
Cultural critique may have gotten its start with the
hermeneutic tradition, but it really gained traction with the
work of Clifford Geertz.46 It is easy to forget that when
Geertz started publishing his work, the social sciences were
still trapped in an empiricist framework. At the time,
"explanation" was entirely "causal" (Hempelian in nature'):
the point of social science was to give a scientific account of
human behavior. Explanation meant prediction in
accordance with law-like accounts of conduct. Geertz
changed all of this by taking anthropology hermeneutic.
But what did Geertz do that was so unique? Why was
his brand of anthropology so different, and so special? It
sounds almost trite to put it this way, but Geertz's insight
was that to understand any behavior (to find out what it
means) required looking at more than just the actor or
subject in question. Put differently, Geertz took the central
insight of hermeneutics-that to understand the part, one
must first understand the whole-and gave it depth and
breadth in the realm of human behavior (culture). No small
46. See CLIFFORD GEERTz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973). I think
it fair to say that Geertz represents but one expression of the hermeneutic
approach to social life first developed in depth by Heidegger. See HEIDEGGER,
supra note 7. Nevertheless, it was the practical application of the hermeneutic
method that marked Geertz's work as unique.
47. See generally CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND
OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1965) (contributing a classic text
in the theory of scientific explanation).
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feat.
Binder and Weisberg describe the work of many of the
social theorists who follow the path blazed by Geertz. These
include Pierre Bourdieu, Stephen Greenblatt, James
Clifford, and Michel Foucault. Chapter Six concludes with
discussions of topics visited in earlier work of the authors.
Binder's work on the cultural significance of the trial of
Klaus Barbie 48 is reprised in discussion of the themes of
group identity and Nazism. The legal regulation of
economics and the representation of wealth end with a
rejection of the postmodernism's claim of the death of
subjectivity. In its place, Binder and Weisberg conclude
that efforts would be better spent investigating the variety
of forms in which we represent our subjectivity both
personally and collectively.
Literary Criticisms of Law is an immensely learned and
provocative work. The great challenge of a survey of any
field, let alone one as complicated as law and literature, is
to write in a way that is both comprehensive-without
being tedious-and interesting to both novice and
professional reader alike. Binder and Weisberg have
written a book that surpasses these goals. This is an
important work of scholarship.

48. Guyora Binder, RepresentingNazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial
ofKlaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989).

